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Abstract
In a sample covering more than 300 cities in the US between January 2000
and July 2009, we nd that more restrictive residential land use regulations and
geographic land constraints are linked to larger booms and busts in housing
prices. The natural and man-made constraints also amplify price responses to
the subprime mortgage-credit expansion in the decade, leading to greater price
increases in the boom and subsequently bigger losses.
JEL classication: R3
Keywords: residential land use regulation; credit expansion; housing prices
1 Introduction
Large swings in asset prices are a concern for macroeconomic stability. The volatil-
ity of housing prices appears particularly destabilizing, as housing busts typically
involve a larger loss in GDP than do equity busts.1 In the housing market, an impor-
tant factor in shaping the dynamics of price cycles is the supply conditions (Capozza
et al., 2002; Malpezzi and Wachter, 2005; Glaeser et al., 2008). In this paper, we
examine the relation between housing supply constraints and the magnitude of price
Department of Economics, University of Alberta, HM Tory 8-14, Edmonton, AB T6G 2H4,
Canada. Email address: haifang.huang@ualberta.ca.
yDepartment of Economics, Bowdoin College, 9700 College Station, Brunswick, Maine 04011-
8497, USA. Email address: ytang@bowdoin.edu.
1Helbling and Terrones (2003) surveyed industrialized countries' experience of economic crises
and found that output losses associated with housing busts were twice as large as those associated
with equity busts (8% versus 4%).
1swings in US local markets during the housing cycle between 2000 and 2009. We
also ask whether supply inelasticity exacerbated the boom-bust consequences of the
subprime mortgage-credit expansion during the decade.
While it is well documented that supply restrictions increase house prices'
responses to positive demand shocks in booms, the evidence on the relation between
supply inelasticity and price declines in busts is weaker. A recent study, Glaeser
et al. (2008), reported that there was little correlation between geographic land
scarcity and the fall in house prices during the bust over 1989-1996. Malpezzi and
Wachter (2005), on the other hand, reported a positive relation between the standard
deviation of price changes over 1979-1996 and a measure of regulatory restrictions
in housing supply. Given the non-conclusiveness of the documented evidence, and
that the destabilizing force of a housing cycle concentrates in the bust, this paper
revisits the relation using data that include the three years of housing downturn
from 2006 to 2009.
Our interest in the subprime mortgage expansion is motivated by the empirical
study in Mian and Su (2008), which points to the extension of mortgage credit to
borrowers of low credit quality as an important driver of the housing cycle in the
last decade. In this paper, we interact local dependence on subprime mortgage
credit with measures of supply constraints in the housing market to test whether
the boom and bust consequences of the subprime expansion depended on housing-
supply conditions.
We consider two types of supply restrictions: residential land use regulations
and geographic land constraints. We are primarily interested in the former; the
inclusion of geographic information acknowledges the possibility that land scarcity
begets regulations.2 Our ndings suggest that both regulatory and geographic con-
2See Saiz (forthcoming) for discussions on the relation between land scarcity and regulation; see
also Malpezzi et al. (1998).
2straints contributed to the amplitude of price booms and busts between 2000 and
2009. During the downturn, the correlations between the two supply constraints and
price declines are statistically signicant and quantitatively substantial. We also nd
that supply inelasticity in the housing market interacted with the subprime expan-
sion in the mortgage market to create greater booms and busts in house prices: an
increase in local residents' dependence on subprime loans was particularly destabi-
lizing in cities that face a high degree of supply restrictions, either from geography
or from land use policies.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature.
Section 3 describes the empirical model and data. Section 4 presents the results.
Section 5 contains a series of robustness tests and a comparison between the 2006-
2009 housing bust and the 1989-1996 bust. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
The paper is related to the literature that studies housing markets through the
perspective of supply, which has received less attention than housing demand. A
special issue on the Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics was intended to
raise awareness of the sparseness of the literature (Rosenthal, 1999). Here we review
some of the more recent contributions.
The literature has pointed to residential land use policy as an important aspect
of housing supply (see Quigley and Rosenthal, 2005, for a review of empirical studies
published before 2004). Glaeser et al. (2005) described the impact of government
regulation on housing supply as a \man-made scarcity," and attributed the increase
in US house prices since the 1970s to the increasing diculty of obtaining approval
for housing development. Their evidence included the combination of increases in
housing prices and decreases in new construction, the increase in the ratios of house
3prices to construction costs, and the extra value for land that is bundled with the
right to build. Quigley and Raphael (2005) constructed an index of regulatory
stringency for California cities, and found that regulatory restrictions are correlated
with higher housing prices and rents, and lower growth in housing stock. Green et al.
(2005) found that stringent regulation is linked to lower estimates of metro-specic
supply elasticities. Ihlanfeldt (2007) and Glaeser and Ward (2009) studied cities in
Florida and the greater Boston area, respectively; both reported positive relations
between regulatory restrictions and house prices.
In terms of measuring regulatory environments, the most recent work, which
also has the largest scale, is Gyourko et al. (2008). It provides multidimensional
measures on local land use control environments for more than 2,600 US cities,
towns and villages. The underlying data source is a 2005 survey and other supple-
mental information. Other contributions include Pendall and Martin (2006), Xing,
Hartzell, and Godschalk (2006) and Malpezzi (1996). In this paper we use the in-
formation from Gyourko et al. (2008) for its larger scale, smaller governmental units
and because it is more recent.
Another factor that is thought to be an important determinant of housing
supply is geographic constraint. Saiz (forthcoming) estimated, for 95 major US
metropolitan areas, the percentage of land that is lost to water bodies, wetlands
or slopes, and showed that a restrictive geography is a \strong predictor of housing
price levels and growth for all metro areas during the 1970-2000 period." Rose (1989)
constructed a similar measure of land constraint for a smaller number of cities.
Our paper diers from a large part of literature in that we focus on short-run

uctuations in house prices; we ask whether regulatory and geographic constraints
are associated with greater booms and busts. In terms of the research question
asked, the paper is close to Capozza et al. (2002), Malpezzi and Wachter (2005) and
4Glaeser et al. (2008).3
Capozza et al. (2002) estimated the serial correlation and the mean reversion
coecients for the dynamics of housing prices in a panel of US metro areas. Among
other ndings, they reported that higher construction costs, which were interpreted
as indicators of supply constraints, were associated with higher serial correlation and
lower mean reversion, thus presenting conditions for overshooting of house prices.
Malpezzi and Wachter (2005) presented a model that features supply lags and
speculative demand from adaptive expectations. In the model, markets with lower
supply elasticity experience larger and more persistent price increases in response
to a positive demand shock; the price movements then attract myopic actions, even-
tually leading to bigger busts in real estate prices. Empirically, the researchers
reported a positive correlation between the stringency of regulation and the stan-
dard deviation of price changes between 1979 and 1996. Our paper will instead
examine conditional responses to credit shocks.
Glaeser et al. (2008) constructed a model of housing bubbles that features ir-
rational overoptimism and adaptive expectations. Because expectations are endoge-
nous to past price movements and the latter are endogenous to supply conditions,
housing bubbles are endogenous to supply conditions as well. The model predicts
that inelastic supply leads to greater price increases in booms; it has ambiguous pre-
dictions on the relation between supply inelasticity and the size of post-bubble price
corrections. On the one hand, supply constraints reduce new construction during
the bubble; so the downward pressure on house prices in the bust from excessive
stock is smaller. On the other hand, house prices increase by more in inelastic areas
and in the process creates housing demand from adaptive expectations. Under some
parameter conditions, supply inelasticity leads not just to a greater price increase,
3Other relevant contributions include Hwang and Quigley (2006) and Saks (2008).
5but also to more construction (proposition 5 of the cited paper), a combination that
will surely lead to a greater price bust after the bubble. Empirically, the researchers
found little relation between the geographic land scarcity developed in Saiz (forth-
coming) and the price declines over the 1989-1996 US housing bust; they did nd a
positive relation between the land constraint and the size of price booms over 1982-
1989 and over 1996-2006. In this paper, our sample period covers the 2006-2009
housing bust that is not in Glaeser et al. (2008).
3 Empirical specication and data
3.1 The empirical specication
The paper studies the US housing cycle between 2000 and 2009, an episode widely
believed to be driven by an expansion of subprime mortgage-credit supply in the
early-to-mid 2000s. The model behind our empirical specication assumes that
cities had dierent supply conditions in the housing market, and that the nationwide
subprime expansion had dierent local impacts on housing demand, because some
cities were more dependent on subprime credit than others. The rst question we ask
is whether supply inelasticity on average was associated with bigger price booms and
busts. The second question is whether or not the impacts of the subprime expansion
on the price cycle depended on supply conditions in the housing market.
The two measures of supply constraints we use are the land use regulation
index from Gyourko et al. (2008) and the geographic constraint from Saiz (forth-
coming). Following Mian and Su (2008), we proxy for the local impacts of subprime
mortgage expansion using the rejection rates of mortgage applications in 1996. If a
city had a higher level of rejection rate before the expansion, we assume that it had
a greater share of residents who were subprime in the sense that their applications
for loans were more likely to be rejected under the old lending standards. The sub-
6prime expansion lowered the standards, providing previously-unqualied borrowers
access to mortgage loans. It will lead to a greater increase in housing demand in
cities where the pool of low-quality borrowers was bigger, as inferred from a higher
rejection rate before the expansion.4 For robustness, we adopt an alternative proxy
measuring the prevalence of risky mortgage loans during the housing boom, namely
the share of mortgage loans that carried high interest-rate spreads during the boom.
Our empirical model, which also includes contemporaneous economic variables
and other controls, is described by the following two equations:
pricei;boom = 0 + c  rejecti + r  regulationi + g  geographic constrainti
+ cr  rejecti  regulationi + cg  rejecti  geographic constrainti
+ X  Xi;boom + ui;boom
pricei;bust = 0 + c  rejecti + r  regulationi + g  geographic constrainti
+ cr  rejecti  regulationi + cg  rejecti  geographic constrainti
+ X  Xi;bust + ui;bust;
where the subscript i indexes cities, and the subscript boom and bust indicate phases
in the housing cycle. The vector of control variables, Xi, include percentage changes
in employment and percentage changes in median household income (the latter is
available only for the boom equation), as well as the city prole in the 2000 census,
including population density, population size, the level of average household income,
the share of urban population, the unemployment rate and the proportion of vacant
housing units.
4We should note that the level of aggregation in Mian and Su (2008) is geographically ner than
ours, as they aggregated the rejection rates at the census-tract level and use them in zip-code level
regressions, while we use the rejection rates at the city level. Nevertheless, the summary statistics
in Table 1 indicate that there are large variations in the rejection rates across cities. Finally, there
are direct measures of mortgage expansion at local levels such as changes in the volume of mortgage
loans, but the loan volume is an equilibrium outcome and cannot be used to explain house prices.
7The important features of the specication are that we break the price move-
ments between 2000 and 2009 into two phases: an initial boom and a bust afterward.
The price changes in the two periods are the dependent variables. City prole and
contemporaneous changes in economic conditions are control variables, while the
focus is on the two supply constraints, the variables proxying for the local impacts
of the subprime mortgage credit expansion, and the interactions between the supply
constraints and the subprime variables; we use the interaction terms to test whether
supply inelasticity has turned the subprime expansion into bigger booms and busts.
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
We have two dierent indices for housing prices. The main results are based on the
index from Zillow.com, because it is available at sub-metropolitan level, same as
the land use regulation index. The second index, used for robustness checks, is the
House Price Index from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (formerly known as
the OFHEO House Price Index), which is available only at the level of metropolitan
areas. Zillow provides estimates of prices for individual houses in US urban areas,
using mostly public data such as county records and information on local housing
market conditions. The estimates have been shown to have good accuracy by the
media and academic literature.5 We are primarily interested in changes in the price
aggregated at the city level. We check the quality of the data by comparing it to
the Federal Housing Finance Agency house price index at the metropolitan level.
We aggregate the Zillow prices to metropolitan areas using populations as weights.
5The Wall Street Journal on line (February 14, 2007) tests the accuracy of Zillow estimates with
a sample of 1,000 homes in seven states, and found a median margin of error of 7.8%, and an equal
split between overestimates and underestimates. The equal split suggests that the price data must
have better accuracy at aggregated levels. We use the aggregated index at city levels. On this
front the Zillow data has good accuracy as well. Mian and Su (2008) uses Zillow data at the zip
code level for robustness checks. They nd from 2,248 zip codes that house price changes from the
Zillow's index and the Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss index have a correlation coecient of 0.91 (page
10 of the cited paper).
8The largest overlapped sample from the two sources has 210 metropolitan areas. We
then calculate, from each index, the price gain in the boom period over 2000-2006
and the price loss in the bust period over 2006-2009. The correlation coecient
between the two sources is 0.93 for the gain and 0.90 for the loss.
The index for regulatory land restriction is the Wharton Residential Land
Use Regulatory Index (WRLURI) developed by Gyourko et al. (2008). The index is
based on a nationwide survey of local land use controls in 2005. The survey reports
information about local jurisdictions' regulatory processes and rules on residential
land use, such as binding limits on new construction, minimum lot size, aordable
housing requirements, open space dedications, and developers' payment for infras-
tructure. It also provides information about the outcomes of the regulatory process
such as change in cost of lot development and change in review time. The survey is
supplemented by information on the legal, legislative and executive actions regard-
ing land use policies. The WRLURI itself is the rst factor from a factor analysis
of eleven subindexes; a higher value indicates a more restrictive environment.
The data on geographic land scarcity is from Saiz (forthcoming), who estimate
the proportion of undevelopable land that is lost to water bodies, wetlands and
slopes within 50-kilometer radii from metropolitan central cities. The estimates are
available for 95 major Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA). We assign to each city
the value associated with the MSA where it locates.
The mortgage rejection rate in 1996 is from the Loan Application Register
(LAR) of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), which is believed to cover a
large majority of mortgage loans sold in the US.6 The percentage of high-cost loans,
dened as mortgage loans sold between 2004 and 2006 that had a rate spread 3 per-
centage points above the Treasury security of comparable maturity, was compiled by
6Avery et al. (2007) reported that HMDA-covered lenders together account for approximately
80% of all home lending nationwide.
9the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for forecasting local
foreclosure risks; the data was also derived from the HMDA database, which reports
the rate-spread information only starting from 2004.7 There is a high correlation
between the two subprime variables (the correlation coecient > 0:7).
Among the control variables, the changes in employment and median house-
hold income are from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics program of the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics and the USA Countries data les, respectively. We use the
information at the county level for better coverage and because the income vari-
able is available only at the county level. Replacing the county-level employment
information with city-level counterparts does not change our main results, but it
reduces the sample size substantially. For the boom regression, we control for both
the employment and income changes. For the bust regression, we have only the
employment changes, because the income information after 2007 is not yet available
at its source. Other control variables are from the 2000 census at the city level.
The paper's denition of city corresponds to incorporated places in the US
census. The sample excludes cities with fewer than 10,000 residents in the 2000
census.8 The use of multiple datasets imposes a multi-level ltering process: Zil-
low's data does not include 15 states that are less densely populated; the regulation
data is from a survey with incomplete responses;9 the geographic information in
Saiz (forthcoming) covers only the biggest 95 metropolitan areas. The nal sample
consists of 327 cities from 28 states.10 It covers areas where 47 million Americans
7See \Neighborhood Stabilization Program Data, Methodology and Data Dictionary for HUD
Provided Data" available on the HUD website.
8The mortgage information, namely the rejection rate and the percentage of high-cost loans, are
aggregated to the city level using census tract-level population as weights.
9According to Gyourko et al. (2008), the jurisdictions that responded to the survey account for
60% of the population being surveyed.
10They are Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Nebraska, New Jer-
sey, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
10resided as of the 2000 census; this is 28% of our targeted population universe (urban
population living in incorporated places with at least 10,000 residents).
To separate the housing cycle into the boom and the bust phases, we examine
the average house prices in the sample. The peak is June of 2006. We thus dene
the price boom as the percentage change in house prices from January 2000 to June
2006, and the price bust as the change from June 2006 to July 2009.
Table 1 provides summary statistics. The average increase of real housing
prices, adjusted with the Consumer Price Index excluding shelters, is 56.54%. The
average price bust is 24.94%. The index of housing regulation has a mean of 0.14
and a standard deviation of 0.87 in our sample. Because the index is standardized
nationally to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, our sample of cities is
slightly more regulated than the average city in the nation and more homogeneous
than the nation as a whole. On average, the cities in the sample have 30.76% of
land that is not suitable for housing development. On average 26.41% of mortgage-
loan applications were rejected in 1996. The standard deviation of the rejection
rate is 12.30%, indicating large variations in the initial credit conditions. Among
the mortgage loans originated between 2004 and 2006, 26.13% were classied as
high-cost loans.
Table 2 tabulates the changes in house prices by regulation index, geographic
constraint and the mortgage rejection rate. It shows that cities that are more regu-
lated or have less developable land experienced larger booms and larger busts in the
prices. The same was true for cities that had higher rejection rates in mortgage ap-
plications in 1996, and those that were sold proportionally more high-interest loans
between 2004 and 2006.
114 Regression Results
Table 3 presents the regression results. Each column in the table corresponds to one
estimation. The variables shown on the top row are dependent variables. Due to the
presence of interactive terms, we removed the means from right-hand side variables
before interacting them with one another. This way we can interpret the coecients
on non-interaction terms as measuring the marginal eects at the sample mean.
Columns (1) and (3) are the boom and bust equations, respectively; they using
the 1996 mortgage rejection rate to measure local dependence on subprime credit.
Column (2) and (4) use the share of high-interest loans instead, but are otherwise
identical counterparts to (1) and (3), respectively.
The estimates show that a more restrictive geographic or regulatory constraint
on housing supply is associated with bigger booms and bigger busts in house prices,
all with statistical signicance at conventional levels. If the a regulation score in-
creases by one standard deviation (in its nationwide scale) and all other variables
remain at the sample averages, the estimates in columns (1) and (3) suggest that
the price boom will be 5.64% greater and the bust 4.55% deeper. If the share of
undevelopable land rises by one-standard deviation (19.38%), all else remaining at
the averages, the price boom will be 9.30% greater and the bust 5.04% deeper.
Quantitatively similar observations are made in column (2) and (4).
Local dependence on subprime mortgage credit (as proxied for by the 1996
rejection rates of mortgage applications and, alternatively, the share of high-cost
mortgages during the boom) is associated with greater swings in house prices. In
cities that have average supply conditions, a one-standard deviation (12.3%) increase
in the rejection rate leads to a 1.35% greater boom and a 5.29% deeper bust. The
picture is markedly dierent if we take into account the interactions between the sub-
prime variables and the supply constraints in the housing market. The interaction
12terms, all attracting statistically signicant coecients, indicate that the subprime
dependence had greater boom-and-bust consequences in cities with inelastic housing
supply. In cities where the regulation constraint is one standard-deviation higher
than the average, the impacts of a one-standard deviation increase in the rejection
rate are 7.5% for the boom and -9.1% for the bust. In cities where the share of unde-
velopable land is one-standard deviation (19.38%) greater, the impacts are 10.89%
in the boom and -6.96% in the bust. Quantitatively similar observations are made
using the share of high-cost mortgages to measure subprime dependence.11
5 Robustness checks and further discussions
We rst address an endogeneity concern. We recognize that, although more stringent
regulation in housing supply is associated with bigger price booms and busts, the
causation between the regulation and price movements can run in both directions.
Unlike in the case of geography, cities can change their residential land use policies,
and their decisions may be a response to the level of and the changes in house prices
(see Saiz, forthcoming). The survey behind the WRLURI was conducted in 2005.
The regulatory environment at the time might have been in
uenced by the gains
in house prices before 2005. For robustness, we estimate the models using the two
sub-indices of the WRLURI at the state-level: the state political involvement index
(SPII) and the state court involvement index (SCII), both developed by Foster
and Summers (2005). The SPII measures the extent to which the executive and
legislative arms of a state promote greater state-wide land use restrictions. The
SCII measures the tendency of the judicial system of a state to uphold municipal
11Specically, in cities with average supply conditions, a one-standard deviation (11.51%) increase
in the share of high-cost mortgages raise the price boom by 4.14% and deepens its bust by 4.37%.
In cities where the regulation index is one-standard deviation higher, the impacts are 7.60% and
-8.17%, respectively. In cities where the share of undevelopable land is one standard deviation
higher, the impacts are 13.07% and -5.49%, respectively.
13land use regulations; it re
ects the court's deference to municipal land controls. The
state-level indexes are likely to be exogenous to city-level movements in house prices,
particularly so with SCII, since the courts are unlikely to judge based on movements
in house prices.
Table 4 reports the tests when local dependence on subprime mortgages is
measured by the pre-expansion rejection rate of mortgage applications. In columns
(1) and (3) of Table 4, we replace the overall index with the SPII. In column (2)
and (4), we use the SCII instead. In all cases, results are similar to Table 3: the
two state-level indices are correlated with the greater booms and greater busts;
their interactions with the credit variable mostly retain their signs and signicance;
the biggest departure is that the interaction between the SCII and the mortgage
rejection rates now has an essentially-zero coecient in the boom equation. Results
are similar when the alterative subprime variable, namely the prevalence of high-cost
loans, is used; for space reasons those estimates are reported in the appendix.
The appendix also reports other robustness tests. In one of them, we interact
the variables of subprime dependence (the 1996 rejection rate or the share of high-
cost loans) with all the city-level census variables in 2000; the purpose is to see if the
interactive terms between the credit variables and the two supply constraints retain
the signs and signicance of their coecients after the inclusion of those many in-
teractive terms. The answer is yes: all estimates retain their signs; most (6 out of 8)
retain their signicance. In another test, we include MSA dummies in all regressions.
The interactions between the geographic land constraint and the two measures of
subprime dependence continue to attract negative and signicant coecients in the
bust equation, indicating that the subprime expansion was particularly destabilizing
in cities that are limited by geography in land supply. Other estimates, however, be-
come statistically insignicant, suggesting that inter-MSA dierences are the driving
14force behind the ndings reported in Table 3.
We now compare our ndings to those from Glaeser et al. (2008). Table 3
shows that cities with a greater geographic constraint experienced a greater decline
in price between June 2006 and July 2009. This nding is dierent from those in
Glaeser et al. (2008), which reported that there was \little correlation between price
declines during the bust [from 1989 to 1996] and the degree of elasticity [measured
by the share of developable land]." (p. 213). Here we show that the dierences in
the two set of ndings are due to dierent episodes. For this purpose, we conduct
a comparison between the two episodes of housing busts using the same price in-
dex, same set of geographic areas and the same model specication, leaving sample
periods as the only source of dierences.
Because Zillow's price index is not available before 2000, we have to switch to
the Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA) House Price Index that was used in
Glaeser et al. (2008). The index is available only at the MSA level, so the analysis has
to switch to the MSA level as well. In the years between the two busts, the US Oce
of Management and Budget changed the area composition of MSAs. This creates
diculty in comparisons over time because the geographic land variable from Saiz
(forthcoming) is measured for MSAs dened under the old federal standard, while
the FHFA index is now published under the new standard. To bypass the problem,
our analysis includes only areas that were largely not aected by the change, which
we dene as areas where more than 90% of residents belong to the same MSA before
and after the change (even if the name of the MSA changed). Our nal sample
consists of 59 MSAs.
We rst regress the price changes over the 1989-1996 housing bust on the share
of undevelopable land, the changes in employment and a constant.12 The coecient
12The data currently available on the BLS State and Area Employment, Hours and Earnings
(SM) program does not go back before 1990. So the change in employment for the earlier episode
15on the land variable is  0:06[stderr= 0:08]. From an identical regression for the
2006-2009 bust, the coecient rises to  0:21[0:05]. Since sample periods are the
only source of dierences, the two estimates present a stark contrast between the
recent episode and the earlier one.
Our eorts to identify the source of dierences between the two episodes of
busts turned out inconclusive. We rst examine new construction in booms that
preceded the busts. Glaeser et al. (2008) shows that during the course of a housing
bubble, inelastic housing supply, combined with adaptive expectation, can theoret-
ically lead to more construction in addition to a greater jump in house prices, a
combination that certainly will lead to greater bust in house prices after the bubble.
Has this theoretical possibility played out in the 2000-2006 boom but less so in the
1982-1989 boom? Simple correlation statistics do not support the hypothesis. In
the MSA sample, the correlation between the share of undevelopable land and new
construction (number of housing permits normalized by the initial housing stock)
is more negative in the recent boom than it was in the earlier one.13 For an alter-
native explanation, we test whether land constraints have forced new construction
to peripheries farther away from metro centers in the boom, and the excessive con-
struction in such fringes had led to a greater bust for the whole area.14 We use
the increases in average commute time to work, obtained from the censuses and
the American Community surveys, to measure the expansion of MSAs.15 We did
not nd signicant correlations between the changes in commute time and the land
variable in either one of the two booms.
is dened as the change from 1990 to 1996, instead of from 1989 to 1996.
13The regressions in Glaeser et al. (2008) show a similar pattern of dierence (tables 3 and 7),
which disappears in their regressions after controlling for climate, income and other variables.
14This possibility was pointed out to us by an anonymous referee.
15For the 1982-1989 boom, we compute the increase in commute time as the dierence in average
commute time between the 1980 and the 1990 censuses (data source: Missouri Census Data Centre).
For the 2000-2006 housing boom, we take the dierence between the mean travel time to work
reported in the 2005-2007 American Community Surveys and that reported in the 1999-2001 surveys.
16A potential source of the dierence is that land constraint has become more
responsible for the increases in house prices during the recent boom. In Glaeser et al.
(2008), the variable of land availability attracts a substantially larger coecient in
explaining price appreciations over the 1996-2006 boom than it does over the 1982-
1989 episode (more than twice as big without covariates and 40% bigger with control
variables; in its Tables 3 and 7). The larger price increases from supply inelasticity
in the more recent cycle might have exposed inelastic areas to greater downward
pressures in the bust.
6 Conclusion
Using data from over 300 US cities, we examine how residential land use regulation,
geographic land scarcity and subprime mortgage credit expansion were related to
the amplitude of housing price cycle between January 2000 and July 2009. We nd
that cities that are more regulated or have less developable land experienced greater
price gains between January 2000 and June 2006, and greater price declines be-
tween June 2006 and July 2009. Furthermore, the supply constraints in the housing
market amplied the boom-and-bust consequences of the subprime expansion in the
mortgage market: an increase in local borrowers' reliance on subprime mortgages
was associated with greater price booms and busts in cities that are more supply
restricted, either by geography or by land use policies.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for key variables
Mean Standard Min Max Obs.
Variable deviation
Housing price change 56.54 57.93 -49.09 454.89 327
between Jan 2000 and June 2006 (%)
Housing price change -24.94 16.52 -65.25 30.88 327
between June 2006 and July 2009 (%)
Wharton Residential Land Use 0.14 0.87 -1.94 3.46 327
Regulatory Index
Proportion of undevelopable area 30.76 19.38 1.04 79.64 327
in Saiz (2008) (%)
Proportion of mortgage applications 26.41 12.30 4.77 65.13 327
denied in 1996 (%)
Proportion of high-cost mortgage loans 26.13 11.51 5.39 70.32 327
between 2004 and 2006 (%)
20Table 2: Housing price boom and bust in subsamples
Average price gain Average price loss Obs.
Subsamples with 2000-2006 2006-2009
more stringent regulation 65.95 -29.19 164
(4.25) (1.15)
less stringent regulation 47.07 -20.65 163
(4.70) (1.34)
more undevelopable area 79.64 -28.58 166
(4.30) (1.17)
less undevelopable area 32.72 -21.18 161
(3.98) (1.35)
more mortgage rejections 73.14 -26.42 164
in 1996 (4.67) (1.46)
less mortgage rejections 39.84 -23.44 163
in 1996 (3.99) (1.08)
more high-interest loans 69.95 -26.10 164
between 2004 and 2006 (5.32) (1.53)
less high-interest loans 43.04 -23.76 163
between 2004 and 2006 (3.25) (0.99)
Note: the numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors of means.









Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
regulation 5.64 4.98 -4.55 -4.66
(2.08) (2.10) (0.92) (0.9)
undevelopable land (%) 0.48 0.5 -.26 -.29
(0.13) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04)




undevelopable land*rejection 0.04 -.007
(0.009) (0.004)
high interest loans (%) 0.36 -.38
(0.24) (0.1)
regulation*high interest loans 0.3 -.33
(0.16) (0.07)
undevelopable land*high interest loans 0.04 -.005
(0.008) (0.003)
 employment 2000-2006 (%) 1.08 0.99
(0.36) (0.35)
 median HH income 2000-2006 (%) 3.85 4.15
(0.36) (0.38)
 employment 2006-2009 (%) 1.28 1.02
(0.22) (0.23)
population density in 2000 0.67 0.58 -.24 -.24
(0.47) (0.46) (0.14) (0.14)
population in 2000 -.007 -.005 0.001 0.0008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.0007) (0.0007)
mean HH income in 2000 0.03 0.05 -.12 -.11
(0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
proportion of urban population (%) 0.46 0.42 -.11 -.12
(0.5) (0.5) (0.31) (0.29)
unemployment rate (%) 2.64 1.95 0.31 0.11
(1.30) (1.21) (0.4) (0.38)
proportion of vacant housing units (%) 0.006 -.55 -.34 -.16
(0.78) (0.7) (0.26) (0.3)
Const. 56.89 57.93 -25.32 -25.81
(2.01) (2.10) (0.79) (0.82)
Obs. 327 327 327 327
R2 0.62 0.63 0.33 0.32
F statistic 79.53 68.52 12.68 14.01
Notes: (1) The variables shown on the top row are dependent variables, measured in percents. (2)
The numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.









Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
state political involvement index 8.30 -5.98
(1.98) (0.86)
state court involvement index 13.95 -7.39
(2.86) (1.65)
undevelopable land (%) 0.46 0.43 -.23 -.23
(0.13) (0.14) (0.04) (0.05)
rejection (%) 0.06 -.15 -.37 -.25
(0.24) (0.26) (0.1) (0.11)
state political involvement*rejection 0.35 -.27
(0.17) (0.08)
state court involvement index*rejection 0.02 -.41
(0.24) (0.12)
undevelopable land*rejection 0.04 0.04 -.007 -.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
 employment 2000-2006 (%) 1.09 1.11
(0.34) (0.35)
 median HH income 2000-2006 (%) 3.64 3.60
(0.37) (0.37)
 employment 2006-2009 (%) 1.33 1.31
(0.22) (0.21)
census prole in 2000 included included included included
Const. 55.45 56.11 -24.31 -24.00
(1.97) (2.10) (0.75) (0.82)
Obs. 327 327 327 327
R
2 0.63 0.63 0.37 0.35
F statistic 89.5 105.88 17.29 19.91
Notes: (1) The variables shown on the top row are dependent variables, measured in percents. (2)
The numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. (4) The census prole variables are from the 2000
census and include the following: population size, population density, the level of average
household income, the share of urban population, the unemployment rate and the proportion of
vacant housing units.
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
regulation 5.71 4.75 -4.09 -3.77
(2.17) (2.15) (0.94) (0.9)
undevelopable land (%) 0.41 0.47 -.24 -.27
(0.12) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04)




undevelopable land*rejection 0.04 -.008
(0.008) (0.003)
high interest loans (%) 0.71 -.70
(0.24) (0.13)
regulation*high interest loans 0.15 -.20
(0.16) (0.08)
undevelopable land*high interest loans 0.04 -.003
(0.008) (0.003)
 employment 2000-2006 (%) 1.03 0.92
(0.32) (0.34)
 median HH income 2000-2006 (%) 3.85 4.16
(0.35) (0.39)
 employment 2006-2009 (%) 1.46 1.15
(0.22) (0.22)
census prole in 2000 included included included included
census prole in 2000*rejection included included
census prole in 2000*high interest loans included included
Const. 60.46 62.53 -27.52 -29.57
(2.86) (2.89) (1.03) (1.20)
Obs. 327 327 327 327
R
2 0.64 0.64 0.37 0.37
F statistic 71.44 50.45 11.38 12.8
Notes: (1) The variables shown on the top row are dependent variables, measured in percents. (2) The
numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.









Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
regulation -3.19 -3.12 -.25 -.26
(3.47) (3.42) (0.58) (0.57)




undevelopable land*rejection 0.01 -.005
(0.01) (0.003)
high interest loans (%) -.04 -.14
(0.19) (0.07)
regulation*high interest loans 0.05 -.01
(0.19) (0.06)
undevelopable land*high interest loans 0.02 -.008
(0.01) (0.003)
 employment 2000-2006 (%) -.14 -.15
(0.27) (0.26)
 median HH income 2000-2006 (%) -.66 -.68
(0.96) (0.92)
 employment 2006-2009 (%) -.53 -.53
(0.38) (0.36)
population density in 2000 -1.15 -1.08 0.23 0.19
(0.78) (0.78) (0.24) (0.22)
population in 2000 0.002 0.002 0.0006 0.0004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.0006) (0.0006)
mean HH income in 2000 -.07 -.04 0.006 -.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
proportion of urban population (%) -.81 -.79 0.12 0.11
(0.39) (0.38) (0.12) (0.12)
unemployment rate (%) 2.68 2.54 -.33 -.17
(0.88) (0.9) (0.29) (0.28)
proportion of vacant housing units (%) -.25 -.19 0.27 0.27
(0.65) (0.67) (0.14) (0.14)
MSA xed eects included included included included
Const. 56.43 56.93 -24.87 -25.11
(1.53) (1.38) (0.36) (0.36)
Obs. 327 327 327 327
R2 0.81 0.81 0.88 0.89
F statistic 1.8 2.21 1.77 2.26
Notes: (1) The variables shown on the top row are dependent variables, measured in percents. (2) The
numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.










Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
state political involvement index 8.01 -5.97
(1.76) (0.77)
state court involvement index 16.32 -9.12
(2.68) (1.51)
undevelopable land (%) 0.48 0.42 -.26 -.25
(0.12) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04)
high interest loans (%) 0.35 0.34 -.36 -.36
(0.22) (0.23) (0.1) (0.1)
state political involvement*high interest loans 0.23 -.18
(0.13) (0.07)
state court involvement Index*high interest loans 0.08 -.39
(0.26) (0.15)
undevelopable land*high interest loans 0.04 0.05 -.009 -.009
(0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
 employment 2000-2006 (%) 0.96 0.81
(0.32) (0.32)
 median HH income 2000-2006 (%) 3.95 3.90
(0.39) (0.38)
 employment 2006-2009 (%) 1.03 1.11
(0.23) (0.22)
census prole in 2000 included included included included
Const. 57.19 57.38 -25.04 -25.04
(2.00) (2.00) (0.73) (0.74)
Obs. 327 327 327 327
R2 0.64 0.64 0.36 0.37
F statistic 71.36 101.16 18.82 19.38
Notes: (1) The variables shown on the top row are dependent variables, measured in percents. (2) The
numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.






undevelopable land (%) -.06 -.21
(0.08) (0.05)
 employment 1990-1996 (%) 0.59
(0.21)






F statistic 6.93 67.10
Notes: (1) The variables shown on the top row are dependent variables, measured in percents. (2) The
numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors. (3) *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. (4) The data currently available on the BLS State and Area Employment,
Hours and Earnings (SM) program does not go back before 1990. So the change in employment for the
earlier episode is dened as the change from 1990 to 1996, instead of from 1989 to 1996.
5